We provide an axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules, analogues of the scoring rules for the multiwinner elections. We show that committee scoring rules are characterized by the set of four standard axioms, anonymity, neutrality, consistency and continuity, and by two axioms specific to multiwinner rules, committee neutrality and committee dominance. In the course of our proof, we develop several new notions. In particular, we introduce and characterize decision rules, a notion that may be useful on its own. There are many other applications and we point the reader to the works of Lu and Boutilier [34, 35] , Elkind et al. [15], and Skowron et al. [45] for a more detailed discussion with an AI focus.
Introduction
Committee scoring rules, recently introduced by Elkind et al. [15] , are multiwinner rules that-on the intuitive level-extend the idea of single-winner scoring protocols 1 to the multiwinner setting. In this paper we confirm this intuition by providing their axiomatic characterization in the style of Young's characterization for the single-winner case [51] (see the work of Merlin [37] for another presentation of Young's result, and the survey of Chebotarev and Shamis [11] for a comprehensive list of related characterizations).
In a multiwinner election, we are given a set of candidates, a collection of voters with preferences over these candidates, and an integer k. The goal is to choose a committee (i.e., a size-k subset of candidates), while respecting these given preferences. Multiwinner elections are very interesting for a number of reasons, and, in particular, due to their very varied applications. Indeed, we can use multiwinner election rules whenever our goal is to select a subset of objects. For example, we may use multiwinner elections to choose a country's parliament, to pick a list of items a search engine should present to the users, to short-list a group of candidates for a prize, to decide which set of products a company should offer to its customers, or even as part of a genetic algorithm [16] . uniform way; it is consistent if for each two elections with the same winner, this candidate also wins if we put these two elections together; and it is continuous if it is always possible to ensure a candidate's victory in a given election by appending to it sufficiently many elections where this candidate is a unique winner. We do show that a very similar characterization-where symmetry, consistency, and continuity are adapted to their natural multiwinner variants-does hold. The only difference is that in our characterization we also use two new axioms, committee neutrality and committee dominance, that deal with issues specific to multiwinner elections. Roughly put, committee neutrality says that if a committee A is better than committee B in some election, then it is also better after we permute members of A and B in some of the votes (but without changing the positions of committees A and B in these votes). Committee dominance ensures a certain monotonicity constraint that Elkind et al. [15] put on committee scoring rules. (Young disregards monotonicity considerations, but if one were to use a typical definition of a single-winner scoring rules where the score assigned to a higher position has to be greater or equal to the scores assigned to lower positions, then one would have to extend Young's characterization in a similar spirit.) Informally stated, our main result is as follows.
Theorem B (Characterization of Committee Scoring Rules). A multiwinner voting rule is a committee scoring rule if and only if it is symmetric, consistent, continuous, committee neutral, and satisfies committee dominance.
quite involved and is divided into two parts. First, we provide a variant of our characterization for decision rules (for this part of the proof, we use a technique that is very different from that used by Young) . Second, we build an inductive argument over Young's characterization to obtain our final result (while this part of the proof is inspired by Young's ideas, it uses new technical approaches and tricks), using results from the first part as tools. We discuss related work in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
Definitions and Notations
In this section we provide necessary background regarding multiwinner elections and committee scoring rules. For each positive integer t, by [t] we mean the set {1, . . . , t}, and by [t] k we mean the set of all k-element subsets of [t] . For each set X and each k ∈ N, by S k (X) we denote the set of all k-element subsets of X (so, in particular, we have that S k ([t]) = [t] k ). For a given set X, we let Π > (X) and Π ≥ (X) denote, respectively, the set of all linear orders and the set of all weak orders over X.
Multiwinner Elections
Let A = {a 1 , . . . , a m } be the set of all the candidates, and let N = {1, 2, . . .} be the set of all the possible voters. We refer to the members of S k (A) as size-k committees, or, simply, as committees, when k is clear from the context. For each subset V ⊆ N, by P(V) we denote the set of all |V|element tuples of elements from Π > (A), indexed by the elements of V. We refer to the elements of P(V) as preference profiles for the set of voters V. We set P = {P ∈ P(V) : V ⊆ N} to be the set of all possible preference profiles. For each preference profile P ∈ P(V) by Vot(P) we denote the set of all the voters in P (in particular, we have that for each P ∈ P(V) it holds that Vot(P) = V). For each profile P and each voter v ∈ Vot(P), by P(v) we denote the preference order of v in P.
Our proof approach crucially relies on using what we call k-decision rules. A k-decision rule f k ,
is a function that for each preference profile P ∈ P provides a mapping, f k (P), that compares size-k committees (for each two size-k committees C 1 and C 2 , we require that f k (P)(C 1 , C 2 ) = − f k (P)(C 2 , C 1 )). For each preference profile P ∈ P, a given k ∈ N, and each two k-element subsets C 1 , C 2 ∈ S k (A), we write C 1 ≻ P C 2 if f k (P)(C 1 , C 2 ) = 1 (the intended meaning is that according to the decision rule f k applied to profile P, committee C 1 is preferred over committee C 2 ). Analogously, we write C 1 = P C 2 if f k (P)(C 1 , C 2 ) = 0 (with the intended meaning that for profile P, rule f k says that both committees are equally good). We write C 1 P C 2 if C 1 ≻ P C 2 or C 1 = P C 2 . Sometimes, when P is a more involved expression, we write C 1 [P] C 2 instead of C 1 P C 2 and C 1 =[P] C 2 instead of C 1 = P C 2 . (Note that for decision rules we do not require the relations ≻ P and P to be transitive; we will add this requirement for multiwinner election rules.) By C 1 ≺ P C 2 we mean C 2 ≻ P C 1 , and by C 1 P C 2 we mean C 2 P C 1 .
Since the just-introduced notation does not specify the rule f k explicitly, the reader may be worried about possible confusion. While, on one hand, including f k in the notation would make the discussion more explicit, it would also make the notation even more heavy than it already is. 3 Since most of the time we use the notation with respect to a single k-decision rule (fixed at the beginning of our proof), we believe that the benefits of the abbreviated notation outweigh the drawbacks.
A k-winner election rule f k is a k-decision rule that additionally satisfies the transitivity requirement, i.e., it is a k-decision rule such that for each profile P and each three committees C 1 , C 2 , and C 3 it holds that
A multiwinner election rule f is a family ( f k ) k∈N of k-winner rules, with one k-winner rule for each committee size k. We remark that often multiwinner rules are defined to simply return the set of winning committees, whereas in our case they-effectively-return weak orders over all possible committees of a given size. Our definition is a bit more general and provides a multiwinner analog of the notion of a social welfare function.
Committee Scoring Rules
For a preference order π ∈ Π > (A), by pos π (a) we denote the position of a in π (the top-ranked candidate has position 1 and the bottom-ranked candidate has position m). A score function assigns a number of points to each position in a preference order. For example, we define the Borda score function, β : [m] → N, so that β(i) = m − i. Similarly, for each t ∈ [m], we define the t-Approval score function, α t , so that if i ≤ t then α t (i) = 1 and otherwise α t (i) = 0. We extend the notion of a position of a candidate to the case of committees in the following way. For each preference order π ∈ orders and each committee C ∈ S k (A), by pos π (C) we mean the set pos π (C) = {pos π (a) : a ∈ C}. By a committee scoring function for committees of size k, we mean a function λ, λ : [m] k → R, that for each element of [m] k , interpreted as a position of a committee, assigns a score. (An intuitive understanding is that the score measures the satisfaction of a voter from a committee that he or she ranks at the given position.) By a committee scoring function we mean a family of committee scoring functions for all possible committee sizes.
We require that committee scoring functions satisfy the following dominance relation. Consider committee size k, and let I and J be two sets from [m] k (i.e., two committee positions) such that I = {i 1 , . . . , i k }, J = { j 1 , . . . , j k }, and it holds that i 1 < · · · < i k and j 1 < · · · < j k . We say that I dominates J if for each t ∈ [k] we have i t ≤ j t (note that this notion might be referred to as "weak dominance" as well, since a set dominates itself). If I dominates J, then we require that λ(I) ≥ λ(J). For each set of voters V ⊆ N and each preference profile P ∈ P(V), by score λ (C, P) we denote the total score that the voters from V assign to committee C. Formally, we have that score λ (C, P) = v∈Vot(P) λ(pos P(v) (C)).
A multiwinner election rule is a committee scoring rule if there exists a committee scoring function λ such that for each two equal-size committees C 1 and C 2 , we have that C 1 ≻ P C 2 if and only if score λ (C 1 , P) > score λ (C 2 , P), and C 1 = P C 2 if and only if score λ (C 1 , P) = score λ (C 2 , P). Committee scoring rules were introduced by Elkind et al. [15] and were later studied by Faliszewski et al. [18, 17] (very related notions were considered by Skowron et al. [45] and by Aziz et al. [3, 4] ). Below we present some examples of committee scoring rules:
1. The single non-transferable vote rule (the SNTV rule) uses scoring function λ SNTV (i 1 , . . . , i k ) = k t=1 α 1 (i t ). In other words, for a given voter it assigns score 1 to every committee that contains the highest-ranked candidate, thus SNTV selects k candidates which are ranked on top by most voters.
2. The Bloc rule uses function λ Bloc (i 1 , . . . , i k ) = k t=1 α k (i t ), i.e., the score a committee gets from a single vote is the number of committee members this vote has among its top k positions.
3. The k-Borda rule uses function λ k-Borda (i 1 , . . . , i k ) = k t=1 β(i t ), i.e., the score a committee gets from a single vote is the sum of the Borda scores of the committee members. [10] ) is defined through function λ β-CC (i 1 , . . . , i k ) = β(min(i 1 , . . . , i k )). Intuitively, under the Chamberlin-Courant rule the highest-ranked member of a committee is treated as the representative for the given voter, and this voter assigns to the committee the Borda score of his or her representative.
The Borda-based Chamberlin-Courant rule (due to Chamberlin and Courant
Elkind et al. [15] and Faliszewski et al. [18, 17] discuss a number of subclasses of committee scoring rules, showing that each of the above rules is, in some well-defined way, rather different from the other ones. Indeed, using their nomenclature (not described here), SNTV is the only nontrivial separable representation-focused rule, Bloc is the only nontrivial weakly separable topk-counting rule, k-Borda is separable (but neither representation-focused nor top-k-counting), and the Borda-based Chamberlin-Courant rule is representation-focused (but neither separable nor topk-counting). Elkind et al. [15] and Faliszewski et al. [18, 17] analyze these subclasses of committee scoring rules and show that they differ quite significantly both in terms of axiomatic properties and in terms of computational properties of the rules included in them (we provide more discussion in Section 5). Yet, in this work we deal with the class of committee scoring rules as a whole and do not consider its internal structure.
Axioms for Our Characterization
In this section we describe the axiomatic properties that we use in our characterization of committee scoring rules. Apart from committee-neutrality and committee dominance, these properties are natural, straightforward generalizations of the respective notions from the world of single-winner elections. We formulate them for the case of k-decision rules (for a given value of k), but since kwinner rules are a type of k-decision rules, the properties apply to k-winner rules as well. For each of our properties P, we say that a multiwinner election rule f = { f k } k∈N satisfies P if f k satisfies P for each k ∈ N.
We start by recalling the definitions of anonymity and neutrality, two properties that are very natural requirements for fair election rules. Intuitively, anonymity says that neither of the voters is specifically privileged nor discriminated against, whereas neutrality says the same for the candidates.
Definition 1 (Anonymity). We say that a k-decision rule f k is anonymous if for each two (not necessarily different) sets of voters V, V ′ ⊆ N such that |V| = |V ′ |, for each bijection ρ : V → V ′ and for each two preference profiles P 1 ∈ P(V) and P 2 ∈ P(V ′ ) such that P 1 
Let σ be a permutation of the set of candidates A. For a committee C, by σ(C) we mean the committee {σ(c) : c ∈ C}. For a linear order π ∈ Π > (A), by σ(π) we denote the linear order such that for each two candidates a and b we have a π b ⇐⇒ σ(a) σ(π) σ(b). For a given k-decision rule f k and profile P, by σ( f k (P)) we mean the function such that for each two size-k committees C 1 and C 2 it holds that σ( f k (P))(σ(C 1 ), σ(C 2 ) = f k (P)(C 1 , C 2 ).
Definition 2 (Neutrality).
A k-decision rule f k is neutral if for each permutation σ of A and each two preference profiles P 1 , P 2 over the same voter set V, such that P 1 
A rule that is anonymous and neutral is called symmetric. We note that our definition of anonymity resembles the ones used by Young [51] or Merlin [37] rather than the traditional ones, as presented by May [36] or Arrow [1] . The difference comes from the fact that we (just like Young and Merlin) need to consider elections with differing voter sets. Indeed, the next axiom describes a situation where we merge two elections with disjoint voter sets.
Definition 3 (Consistency).
A k-decision rule f k is consistent if for each two profiles P and P ′ over disjoint sets of voters, V ⊂ N and V ′ ⊂ N, V ∩ V ′ = ∅, and each two committees C 1 , C 2 ∈ S k (A), (i) if C 1 ≻ P C 2 and C 1 P ′ C 2 , then it holds that C 1 ≻ P+P ′ C 2 (where P + P ′ denotes the profile that consists of all the voters from P and P ′ ) and (ii) if C 1 P C 2 and C 1 P ′ C 2 , then it holds that
In some sense, consistency is the most essential element of Young's characterization, that distinguishes single-winner scoring rules from the other single-winner rules. (Though we mention that Kemeny rules satisfies the reinforcement axiom, which is very similar to consistency, but different. 4 We point the reader to the work of Young and Levenglick for an axiomatic characterization of the Kemeny's rule [52] .) Remark 1. In our proofs, we often use the consistency axiom in the following way. Let C 1 and C 2 be two committees and let P and Q be two profiles over disjoint voter sets, such that C 1 ≻ P+Q C 2 and C 1 = P C 2 . Using consistency, we can conclude that C 1 ≻ Q C 2 . Indeed, if, for example, it were 4 In essence, if we were to express the reinforcement axiom in our language, it would be defined in the same way as our consistency axiom, except that it would only by applicable to profiles P and P ′ such that f k (P) = f k (P ′ ). That is, reinforcement puts a condition on the result of a decision rule, provided that the rule is applied to some profile P + P ′ such that the result of comparing each two committees is the same both under P and under P ′ . Our variant of consistency puts a condition on the result of a decision rule, provided that the rule is applied to some profile P + P ′ such that there is at least one pair of committees whose comparison under P and P ′ gives the same result. In effect, our consistency axiom is far stronger than the reinforcement axiom.
the case that C 2 ≻ Q C 1 then by consistency (as applied to merging profiles P and Q) we would have to conclude that C 2 ≻ P+Q C 1 and we assumed the opposite.
The next axiom is specific to the multiwinner setting and, to the best of our knowledge, is new to this paper. Informally speaking, it says that each voter views each committee as a coherent body rather than as a set of independent members (and, thus, the value of a committee does not change if we swap the positions of some committee members).
Definition 4 (Committee Neutrality).
A k-decision rule f k is committee-neutral if for each two committees C 1 , C 2 ∈ S k (A), each voter set V, and each two preference profiles P 1 , P 2 ∈ P(V) such that P 1 and P 2 agree on all but a single vote v, the following holds: If it is possible to obtain P 1 (v) from P 2 (v) by permuting candidates within set C 1 \ C 2 , within set C 2 \ C 1 , and within set C 1 ∩ C 2 , then it holds that
Our next axiom regards the dominance relation between committee positions, and specifies a basic monotonicity condition (it can also be viewed as a form of Pareto dominance).
Definition 5 (Committee Dominance). A k-decision rule f k has the committee dominance property if for each two committees C
The definition of committee scoring rules requires that if λ is a committee scoring function (for committee size k), and I and J are two committee positions such that I dominates J, then λ(I) ≥ λ(J). In our characterization, we use the committee dominance axiom to ensure that this property indeed holds.
Finally, we define the continuity property, which ensures that if a certain set of voters V prefers C 1 over C 2 , then for each set of voters V ′ , disjoint from V, there exists some (possibly large) number n, such that if we clone V exactly n times and add such a profile to V ′ , then in this final profile C 1 is preferred to C 2 (note that when we speak of cloning voters, we implicitly assume that the decision rule is anonymous and that the identities of the cloned voters do not matter). Thus, continuity might be viewed as a kind of "large enough majority always gets its choice" principle. Definition 6 (Continuity). An anonymous k-decision rule f k is continuous if for each two committees C 1 , C 2 ∈ S k (A) and each two profiles P 1 and P 2 where C 1 ≻ P 2 C 2 , there exists a number n ∈ N such that for the profile Q that consists of the profile P 1 and of n copies of the profile P 2 , it holds that
For more discussion on continuity, we refer the reader to the original work of Young [51] . Briefly put, the role of the continuity axiom is to avoid certain tie-breaking issues (Young's characterization without continuity defines rules that are scoring rules that break ties using other scoring rules, that break ties using yet other scoring rules, and so on).
Main Result
We now present our main result, the axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules.
Theorem 1. A multiwinner election rule f is symmetric, committee-neutral, consistent, continuous, and has the committee dominance property if and only if it is a committee scoring rule.
The proof is rather involved and we divide it into two main parts. In the first part, in Section 4.1, we show that preference profiles can be represented as elements of a certain linear space and we prove a variant of Theorem 1 for the case of decision rules (through Theorem 2 and Corollary 1), i.e., for the case where we do not require transitivity. Naturally, in this case the theorem does not speak of committee scoring rules (since the outcomes of committee scoring rules always have to be transitive), but, instead, we introduce a somewhat more general notion of committee-pairs scoring rules. A committee-pairs scoring rule is defined through a committee-pairs scoring function, which assigns a score (possibly negative) to a pair of committee positions. A committee-pairs scoring rule, given two committees, C 1 and C 2 , and a profile P, computes for each voter v ∈ Vot(P) the committee-pairs score of (pos P(v) (C 1 ), pos P(v) (C 2 )). Then it sums up these scores and, if the value is positive, it declares C 1 to be the preferred over C 2 ; if the sum is zero, it declares the committees to be equally good; and if the sum is negative, it declares C 2 to be preferred over C 1 .
The main technical conclusion from the analysis provided for decision rules is that the set of profiles for which two arbitrary committees, C 1 and C 2 , are judged as equally good, is a linear subspace of dimension m! − 1 in the linear space of all preference profiles of dimension m! (intuitively-for the case of anonymous rules-every profile can be seen as an m!-dimensional vector specifying how many times each possible vote repeats). The second important conclusion, provided in Lemma 4, says that we only need to characterize the subspace where C 1 and C 2 are judged as equally good. If a given (nontrivial) scoring function correctly identifies committees as equivalent in the subspace of profiles P such that C 1 = P C 2 , then it (or its negation) must correctly identify the profiles P ′ where
We use the results from Section 4.1 in two ways. First, Corollary 1 is an interesting characterization in its own right. Second, Theorem 2 and Lemma 4 jointly provide a very strong technical tool for the second part of the proof.
The second part of the proof is included in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. In Section 4.2, we prove Theorem 1 for the case where f is used to recognize in which profiles a certain committee C 1 is preferred over some other committee C 2 , such that |C 1 ∩ C 2 | = k − 1. If |C 1 ∩ C 2 | = k − 1 then there are only two candidates, let us refer to them as c 1 and c 2 , such that C 1 = (C 1 ∩ C 2 ) ∪ {c 1 }, and C 2 = (C 1 ∩ C 2 ) ∪ {c 2 }. Thus, this case closely resembles the single-winner setting, studied by Young [51] and Merlin [37] . For each two candidates c 1 and c 2 , Young and Merlin show a base of the linear space of preference profiles that satisfies the following two properties:
(i) For each preference profile in the base, the scores of c 1 and c 2 are equal according to every possible scoring function.
(ii) Candidates c 1 and c 2 are "symmetric" and, thus, every neutral and anonymous voting rule has to judge them as equally good.
These observation allow one to use geometric arguments to note that the set of profiles in which c 1 is preferred over c 2 can be separated from the set of profiles in which c 2 is preferred over c 1 by a hyperplane. The coefficients of the linear equation that specifies this hyperplane define a single-winner scoring rule, and this scoring rule is exactly the voting rule that one started with. In Section 4.2 we use the same geometric arguments, but the construction of the appropriate base is more sophisticated. Indeed, finding this base is the core technical part of Section 4.2. In Section 4.3 we extend the result from Section 4.2 to the case of any two committees (irrespective of the size of their intersection), concluding the proof. Here, finding appropriate base seems even harder and, consequently, we use a different technique. To deal with committees C 1 and C 2 that have fewer than k − 1 elements in common, we form a third committee, C 3 , whose intersections with C 1 and C 2 have more elements than the intersection of C 1 and C 2 . Then, using an inductive argument, we conclude that the space of profiles P where C 1 = P C 3 is (m! − 1)-dimensional, and that the same holds for the space of profiles P such that C 2 = P C 3 . An intersection of two linear spaces with this dimension has dimension at least m! − 2 and, so, we have an at-least-(m − 2)! dimensional space of profiles P such that C 1 = P C 2 . Using combinatorial tricks, we find a profile P ′ which does not belong to the space but for which C 1 = P ′ C 2 still holds. This gives us our (m − 1)!-dimensional space. By applying results from the first part of the proof, this suffices to conclude that the committee scoring function that we found for committees that differ in at most one element works for all other committees as well.
First Part of the Proof: Decision Rules
We start our analysis by considering k-decision rules. Recall that the outcomes of k-decision rules do not need to be transitive. That is, for a k-decision rule f k it is possible to have a profile P and three committees such that C 1 ≻ P C 2 , C 2 ≻ P C 3 , and C 3 ≻ P C 1 . Omitting transitivity allows us to derive necessary technical results.
The whole discussion, i.e., this and the next section, is divided into small subsections, each with a title describing its main outcome. These section titles are intended to help the reader navigate through the proof, but otherwise one can read the text as a continuous piece. In particular, all the notations, conventions, and definitions carry over from one subsection to the next, and so on.
Setting up the Decision Rule. Let us fix some arbitrary committee size k, and let f k be some symmetric, consistent, committee-neutral, and continuous k-decision rule. Our goal in this part of the proof is to show that this rule must be a committee-pairs scoring rule (we will define this notion soon), and to obtain a number of technical tools for the second part of the proof.
First Domain
Change Anonymity of f k allows us to use a more convenient domain for representing preference profiles. Specifically, we can view f k as a function:
with the domain N m! instead of P (recall the definition of a k-decision rule in Section 2.1). Each element P of N m! , referred to as a voting situation, describes how many voters cast each of the m! possible different votes. We view voting situations as vectors of nonnegative integers, indexed with preference orders from Π > (A) (that is, for π ∈ Π > (A) and voting situation P, by P(π) we mean the number of voters in P with preference order π). This will be helpful in our further analysis because it allows us to perform algebraic operations on voting situations, such as adding them or multiplying them by constants. For a voting situation P and a constant c ∈ N, cP is the voting situation that corresponds to P in which each voter was replaced by c copies of him or her. Similarly, for two voting situations P and Q, P + Q is the voting situation obtained by merging P and Q.
Given a voting situation P, when we speak of "some vote v in P," we mean "some preference order that occurs within P." We implicitly treat each vote v (i.e., each preference order) as a voting situation that contains this vote only. When we say that we modify some vote within some voting situation P, we mean modifying only one copy of this vote, and not all the votes that have the same preference order. This is different from the case of preference profiles where we distinguished votes from voters-we recall that we used the symbol v to denote voters and P(v) to denote the vote of v within P. However, we think that this will not lead to any confusion and our arguments will become clearer.
Independence of Committee Comparison from Irrelevant Swaps
We observe that for each two committees C 1 and C 2 , the result of their comparison according to f k depends only on the positions on which they are ranked by the voters (and not on the positions of candidates not in C 1 ∪ C 2 ). Lemma 1. Let C 1 and C 2 be two size-k committees, let P be a voting situation, and let a and b be two candidates such that a, b C 1 ∪ C 2 . Let v be a vote in P. By P[v, a ↔ b] we mean the voting situation obtained from P by swapping a and b in v. It holds that
Proof. We assume that C 1 P C 2 and we will show that C 1 P[v,a↔b] C 2 . For the sake of contradiction, we assume that this is not the case and that C 2 ≻ P[v,a↔b] C 1 holds.
We rename the candidates so that C 1 \C 2 = {a 1 , . . . , a ℓ } and C 2 \C 1 = {b 1 , . . . , b ℓ }, and we define σ to be a permutation (over the set of candidates) that for each x ∈ [ℓ] swaps a x and b x , but leaves all the other candidates intact. That is, σ(a 1 ) = b 1 , σ(b 1 ) = a 1 , . . . , σ(a ℓ ) = b ℓ , σ(b ℓ ) = a ℓ , and for each candidate c {a 1 , . . . , a ℓ , b 1 , . . . , b ℓ } it holds that σ(c) = c. Since C 1 P C 2 , by neutrality we have that C 2 σ(P) C 1 . Due to our assumptions, it holds that C 2 ≻ P[v,a↔b] C 1 and, by consistency, we get that:
We write v[a ↔ b] to denote the vote (and, by our convention, a single-vote voting situation) obtained from v by swapping candidates a and b.
Since we have that:
and the two voting situations in the final sum are symmetric with respect to σ and committees C 1 and C 2 , by symmetry of f k we have that:
Thus, by using consistency-as applied to equations (1) and (2) in the way described in Remark 1we get that C 2 ≻ Q C 1 . Let δ be a permutation that is identical to σ, except that it also swaps a and b. We note that:
That is, δ(Q) = Q, and, by symmetry, it must be the case that C 2 = Q C 1 . However, this is a contradiction with our previous conclusion that C 2 ≻ Q C 1 . This completes the proof.
Committee-Pairs Scoring Rules
Before proceeding further, we need to define committee-pairs scoring rules, a useful class of k-decision rules. These rules are somehow similar to committee scoring rules, with the difference that the scores of two committees cannot be computed independently. Instead, for each pair of committee positions (I 1 , I 2 ) we define a numerical value, the score that a voter assigns to the pair of committees (C 1 , C 2 ) under the condition that C 1 and C 2 stand in this voter's preference order on positions I 1 and I 2 , respectively (this score can be negative). If the total score of a pair of committees (C 1 , C 2 ) is positive, then C 1 is preferred over C 2 ; if it is negative, then C 2 is preferred over C 1 ; if it is equal to zero, then C 1 and C 2 are seen as equally good. 
. For each preference profile P ∈ P and for each pair of committees (C 1 , C 2 ), we define the score:
A k-decision rule is a committee-pairs scoring rule if there exists a committee-pairs scoring function d such that for each voting situation P and each two committees C 1 and C 2 it holds that:
Naturally, we can speak of applying committee-pairs scoring rules to voting situations instead of applying them to preference profiles. For a voting situation P ∈ P, the score of committee pair (C 1 , C 2 ) is:
(Recall that for π ∈ Π > (A), P(π) is the number of voters with preference order π within P.)
Putting the Focus on Two Fixed Committees Recall that we have assumed f k to be symmetric, consistent, committee-neutral and continuous. Now, we fix a pair of size-k committees, C 1 and C 2 , and define f C 1 ,C 2 to be the rule that acts on voting situations in the same way as f k does, but with the difference that it only distinguishes whether (i) C 1 is preferred over C 2 , or (ii) C 2 is preferred over C 2 , or (iii) C 1 and C 2 are seen as equally good. In other words, we set f C 1 ,C 2 (P) to be −1, 0 or 1 depending on f k (P) ranking C 1 lower than, equivalent to, or higher than C 2 , respectively ( f k can be viewed as the collection of rules f C ′ 1 ,C ′ 2 , one for each possible pair of committees C ′ 1 and C ′ 2 ). We define function f k,|C 1 ∩C 2 | so that for each voting situation P, relation f k,|C 1 ∩C 2 | (P) is the restriction of f k (P) to pairs of committees
Defining the Distinguished Profiles For each two committee positions I 1 and I 2 such that |I 1 ∩
, where C 1 and C 2 are ranked on positions I 1 and I 2 , respectively, and all the other candidates are ranked arbitrarily, but in some fixed, predetermined order. Let us consider two cases. First, let us assume that for each two committee positions I 1 and
. By committee-neutrality and by Lemma 1, we infer that for each single-vote voting situation v we have C 1 = v C 2 (because the set of positions shared by C 1 and C 2 always has the same cardinality). Further, by consistency, we conclude that f C 1 ,C 2 is trivial, i.e., for every voting situation P it holds that C 1 = P C 2 . By neutrality, we get that f k,|C 1 ∩C 2 | also is trivial (i.e., it declares equivalent each two committees whose intersection has |C 1 ∩C 2 | candidates). Of course, in this case ρ k is a committee-pairs scoring rule (with trivial scoring function).
If the above case does not hold, then there are some two committee positions, I * 1 and I * 2 , such that |I *
A big chunk of the discussion that follows is aimed at showing that in this case we also can conclude that ρ k is a committee-pairs scoring rule.
For each two committee positions I 1 and I 2 such that |I 1 ∩ I 2 | = |I * 1 ∩ I * 2 | = |C 1 ∩ C 2 |, and for each two nonnegative integers x and y, we define voting situation:
.
That is, in this voting situation there are y voters that rank C 1 and C 2 on positions, respectively, I * 1 and I * 2 , and there are x voters that rank C 1 and C 2 on positions, respectively, I 1 and I 2 .
Deriving the Components for the Committee-Pairs Scoring Function for f k We now proceed toward defining a committee-pairs scoring function for f k . To this end, we define the value ∆ I 1 ,I 2 as:
This definition certainly might seem unintuitive at first. However, we will show that the values ∆ I 1 ,I 2 , for all possible I 1 and I 2 , in essence, define a committee-pairs scoring function for f k . The next few lemmas should build an intuition for the nature of these values and for how this committee-pairs scoring rule operates. As a quick sanity check, the reader can verify that ∆ I * 1 ,I * 2 = 1. 5 5 Briefly put, we first note that for each positive integer z, we have
Further, due to consistency of f k (used as in Remark 1), we observe that
Let us argue that the values ∆ I 1 ,I 2 are well defined. To this end, let us fix some committee positions I 1 and I 2 (such that |I 1 ∩ I 2 | = |I * 1 ∩ I * 2 |). First, due to continuity of f k , we see that the appropriate sets in Equation (5) 
x(C 1 →I 2 ,C 2 →I 1 ) C 1 . This proves that the set from the first condition of (5) is nonempty. An analogous reasoning proves the same fact for the set from the second condition in (5) . Second, we claim that the value ∆ I 1 ,I 2 needs to be finite. This is evident for the case where we take the infimum over the set of positive rational numbers. For the case where we take the supremum, this follows from Lemma 2, below.
Lemma 2. For each two committee positions I 1 and I
Proof. We assume, without loss of generality, that 6 Let us consider two sets:
(U is the set that we take supremum of in Equation (5)), and:
(thus, L is the set that we take infimum of in Equation (5), for ∆ I 2 ,I 1 ). We will show that sup U = inf L. First, we show that sup U ≤ inf L. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that this is not the case, i.e., that there exists y
Since y x ∈ U and y ′ x ′ ∈ L, we get that:
x ′ (C 1 →I 1 ,C 2 →I 2 ) C 1 . Let us consider voting situation S :
By consistency, we have that C 2 ≻ S C 1 . However, let us count the number of voters in S that rank committees C 1 and C 2 on particular positions. There are yy ′ voters that rank C 1 and C 2 on positions I * 1 and I * 2 , respectively, and there are yy ′ voters that rank C 1 and C 2 on positions I * 2 and I * 1 . Due to neutrality and consistency, these voters cancel each other out. (Formally, if S ′ were a voting situation limited to these voters only, we would have C 1 = S ′ C 2 . This so due to symmetry of f k and the fact that for permutation σ that swaps all the members of C 1 \ C 2 with all the members of C 2 \C 1 , we have S ′ = σ(S ′ ).) Next, there are x ′ y voters that ranks C 1 and C 2 on positions I 1 , and I 2 , and there are xy ′ voters that rank C 1 and C 2 on positions I 2 and I 1 , respectively. Since we assumed that y x > y ′ x ′ , we have that x ′ y > xy ′ . So, xy ′ of the voters from each of the two just-mentioned groups cancel each other out (in the same sense as above), and we are left with considering x ′ y − xy ′ > 0 voters that rank C 1 and C 2 on positions I 1 and I 2 . Thus, we conclude that C 1 ≻ S C 2 . However, this contradicts the fact that C 2 ≻ S C 1 and we conclude that sup U ≤ inf L.
Next, we show that sup U ≥ inf L. To this end, we will show that there are no values y
For the sake of contradiction let us assume that this is not the case and that such values exist. It must be the case that y x is not in U and, so, we have:
Since y x also cannot be in L, we have:
By neutrality (applied to (7) with permutation σ that swaps candidates from C 1 \C 2 with those from C 2 \ C 1 ), we have that:
By putting together Equations (6) and (8), and by noting that the same reasoning can be repeated for y ′ x ′ instead of y x , we conclude that it must be the case that:
After applying the permutation σ that swaps all the members of C 1 \ C 2 with all the members of C 2 \ C 1 to the voting situation from the first of the above two conditions, from the neutrality we get that:
We now define voting situation Q:
x ′ (C 1 →I 2 ,C 2 →I 1 ) .
From Equation (9) (and consistency), we get that C 1 = Q C 2 . In Q there is the same number of voters who rank C 1 and C 2 on positions I 1 and I 2 as those that rank them on positions I 2 and I 1 , respectively (so these voters cancel out). On the other hand, there are yx ′ voters who rank C 1 and C 2 on positions I * 2 and I * 1 , and y ′ x voters who rank these committees on positions I * 1 and I * 2 , respectively. Since yx ′ < y ′ x, we get that C 1 ≻ Q C 2 , which contradicts our earlier observation that C 1 = Q C 2 . We conclude that it must be the case that sup U ≥ inf L.
Finally, since we have shown that sup U ≤ inf L and sup U ≥ inf L, we have that sup U = inf L. This proves that ∆ I 2 ,
The next lemma shows that ∆ I 1 ,I 2 provides a threshold value for proportions of voters in distinguished profiles with respect to the relation between C 1 and C 2 . Lemma 3. Let I 1 and I 2 be two committee positions such that
For each x, y ∈ N it holds that:
Proof. Let us start with proving the first statement. We assume that
and, for the sake of contradiction, that:
From the definition of ∆ I 1 ,I 2 we infer that there exist two numbers
Let us consider a voting situation that is obtained from P y(C 1 →I * 1 ,C 2 →I * 2 )
x(C 1 →I 2 ,C 2 →I 1 ) (i.e., from the voting situation that appears in (10)) by swapping positions of C 1 and C 2 , i.e., let us consider voting situation P y(C 1 →I * 2 ,C 2 →I * 1 )
x(C 1 →I 1 ,C 2 →I 2 ) . Naturally, in such a voting situation C 2 is weakly preferred over C 1 :
By Equations (11), (12) , and consistency of f k , we see that in the voting situation:
committee C 2 is strictly preferred over C 1 (i.e., C 2 ≻ P C 1 ). Let us now count the voters in P. There are xx ′ who put C 1 and C 2 on positions I 1 and I 2 , respectively, and there are xx ′ voters who put C 1 and C 2 on positions I 2 and I 1 , respectively. By the same arguments as used in the proof of Lemma 2, these voters cancel each other out. Next, there are y ′ x voters who put C 1 and C 2 on positions I * 1 and I * 2 , respectively, and there are x ′ y voters who put C 1 and C 2 on positions I * 2 and I * 1 , respectively. Since y ′ x > yx ′ . we conclude that C 1 ≻ P C 2 (again, using the same reasoning as we used in Lemma 2 for similar arguments). This is a contradiction with our earlier observation that C 2 ≻ P C 1 . This completes the proof of the first part of the lemma.
The proof of the second statement is similar and we provide it for the sake of completeness. We assume that C 2 ≻ v(C 1 → I 1 , C 2 → I 2 ) C 1 and, for the sake of contradiction, that:
From the definition of ∆ I 1 ,I 2 we know that there must be two numbers x ′ , y ′ ∈ N, such that y x > y ′ x ′ ≥ −∆ I 1 ,I 2 and:
If we swap the positions of committees C 1 and C 2 in the voting situation used in Equation (13), then by neutrality we have that:
We now form voting situation:
By Equations (14), (15) , and consistency of f k we have that C 2 ≻ Q C 1 . However, counting voters again leads to a contradiction. Indeed, we have xx ′ voters who put C 1 and C 2 and positions I 1 and I 2 , respectively, and xx ′ voters who put C 1 and C 2 on positions I 2 and I 1 , respectively. These voters cancel each other out. Then we have y ′ x voters who put C 1 and C 2 on positions I * 2 and I * 1 , respectively, and we have x ′ y voters who put C 1 and C 2 on positions I * 1 and I * 2 , respectively. Since
which is a contradiction with our previous conclusion that C 2 ≻ Q C 1 . This proves the second part of the lemma.
Putting Together the Committee-Pairs Scoring Function for f k We are ready to define a committee-pairs scoring function d for f k . For each two committee positions, I 1 and I 2 , we set:
which allows us to rewrite Definition 7 as follows (considering P to be a voting situation):
Note that by Lemma 2, d indeed satisfies the conditions put on a committee-pairs scoring rule.
The next theorem shows that d is a committee-pairs scoring function for f C 1 ,C 2 . Based on this result, we will argue that it works for all pairs of committees.
Theorem 2. For each voting situation P it holds that
Proof. We start by proving part (i). Let P be some voting situation such that score d (C 1 , C 2 , P) > 0. For the sake of contradiction we assume that C 2 P C 1 .
The idea of the proof is to perform a sequence of transformations of P so that the result according to f k does not change, but, eventually, each voter puts committees C 1 and C 2 either on positions I * 1 , I * 2 or the other way round. Let s be the total number of transformations we perform, and let P i be the voting situation that we obtain after the i-th transformation. We ensure that for each voting situation P i it holds that score d (C 1 , C 2 , P i ) > 0 and C 2 P i C 1 . In particular, for the final voting situation P s we will have C 2 P s C 1 , score d (C 1 , C 2 , P s ) > 0, and each voter will put committees C 1 and C 2 on positions I * 1 and I * 2 or the other way round. However, from score d (C 1 , C 2 , P s ) > 0 we will conclude that there must be more voters who put C 1 and C 2 on positions I * 1 and I * 2 than on positions I * 2 and I * 1 . This will be a contradiction with C 2 P s C 1 .
We now describe the transformations. We set P 0 = P. We perform the i-th transformation in the following way. If for each voter in P i−1 , committees C 1 and C 2 stand on positions I * 1 and I * 2 (or the other way round), we finish our sequence of transformations. Otherwise, we take a preference order of an arbitrary voter from P i−1 , for whom the set of committee positions of C 1 and C 2 is not {I * 1 , I * 2 }. Let us denote this voter by v i . Let z denote the number of voters in P i−1 who rank C 1 and C 2 on the same positions as v i , including v i (so z ≥ 1). Let I 1 and I 2 denote the positions of the committees C 1 and C 2 in the preference order of v i , respectively. Let ǫ = score d (C 1 , C 2 , P i−1 )/2z > 0.
then we obtain P i by removing from P i−1 all z voters with the same preference order as v i . By consistency of f k , it follows that in the resulting voting situation P i it still holds that C 2 P i C 1 (this is, in essence, the same canceling out of voters that we already used in Lemmas 2 and 3). Also, since score
then let x and y be such integers that ∆ I 1 ,I 2 − ǫ < y x < ∆ I 1 ,I 2 (recall that ǫ is defined just above Case 1, and that z is the number of voters with the same preference order as v i ). We define two new voting situations:
From Lemma 3 it follows that C 2 ≻ R i−1 C 1 and, by consistency, we get that C 2 ≻ Q i−1 C 1 .
Let us now calculate the value of score d (C 1 , C 2 , R i−1 ). R i−1 consists of zx voters who rank C 1 and C 2 on positions I 2 and I 1 (and who contribute zx∆ I 2 ,I 1 = −zx∆ I 1 ,I 2 to the value of score d (C 1 , C 2 , R i−1 )) and of zy voters who rank C 1 and C 2 on positions I * 1 and I * 2 , respectively (who contribute value zy∆ I *
Further, by definition of ǫ, we have that score d (C 1 , C 2 , P i−1 ) = 2zǫ. In effect, we have that:
The first inequality (in the final row) follows from the fact that we assumed ∆ I 1 ,I 2 − ǫ < y x < ∆ I 1 ,I 2 . We now move on to Case 3, where we also build voting situation Q i−1 with a similar property, and then describe how to obtain P i from Q i−1 's.
then our reasoning is very similar to that from Case 2.
Let x and y be such integers that −∆ I 1 ,I 2 < y x < −∆ I 1 ,I 2 + ǫ. We define two voting situations:
From Lemma 3 it follows that C 2 ≻ R i−1 C 1 , and, thus, from consistency, we get that C 2 ≻ Q i−1 C 1 . Further, using similar analysis as in Case 2, we get that:
The first inequality (in the final row) follows from the assumption that −∆ I 1 ,I 2 < y x < −∆ I 1 ,I 2 + ǫ. Below we describe how to obtain P i from Q i−1 (for both Cases 2 and 3).
In Cases 2 and 3, in the voting situation Q i−1 exactly zx voters have C 1 and C 2 on positions I 2 and I 1 , respectively (for both cases, these voters are introduced in voting situation R i−1 ). Further, there are exactly zx voters who rank C 1 and C 2 on positions I 1 and I 2 , respectively (these are the cloned-x-times voters that were originally in P i−1 ). We define P i as Q i−1 with these 2zx voters removed. Since we removed the same number of voters who rank C 1 and C 2 on positions I 2 and I 1 , respectively, as the number of voters who rank these committees on positions I 1 and I 2 , respectively, we conclude that score d (C 1 , C 2 , P i ) = score d (C 1 , C 2 , Q i−1 ) > 0 and that C 2 P i C 1 .
We note that after the just-described transformation none of the voters has C 1 and C 2 on positions I 1 and I 2 , respectively, and that we only added number of voters that rank C 1 and C 2 on positions I * 1 and I * 2 (or the other way round). Hence, if we perform such transformations for all possible pairs of committee positions I 1 and I 2 , we will obtain our final voting situation, P s , for which it holds that (i) score d (C 1 , C 2 , P s ) > 0, (ii) C 2 P s C 1 , and (iii) in P s each voter ranks C 1 and C 2 on positions I * 1 and I * 2 (or the other way round). Given (i) and (iii) we conclude that in P s there are more votes in which C 1 stands on position I * 1 and C 2 stands on position I * 2 than there are voters where the opposite holds. However, this implies that C 1 ≻ P s C 2 and contradicts the fact that C 2 P s C 1 . This completes the proof of the first part of the theorem.
Next, we consider part (ii) of the theorem. Let P be some voting situation such that score d (C 1 , C 2 , P) = 0. For the sake of contradiction we assume that C 2 P C 1 , and, without loss of generality, we make it C 2 ≻ P C 1 . Since for the voting situation v(
) > 0, then for each n ∈ N, in voting situation:
we have score d (C 1 , C 2 , Q n ) > 0, and-from part (i) of the theorem-we get that C 1 ≻ Q n C 2 . On the other hand, continuity requires that there exists some value of n such that C 2 ≻ Q n C 1 . This gives a contradiction and completes the proof.
We have proven Theorem 2 for the function f C 1 ,C 2 . From neutrality it follows that the thesis holds for f k,|C 1 ∩C 2 | . Now, let us argue that it also holds for f k . Indeed, for the thesis of Theorem 2 we needed to define a committee-pairs scoring function d only for such pairs (I 1 , I 2 ) that |I 1 ∩ I 2 | = |C 1 ∩ C 2 |. Since the choice of C 1 and C 2 was arbitrary, for each value of i, 0 ≤ i ≤ k, we can take arbitrary sets C 1 = C 1,i and C 2 = C 2,i such that |C 1,i ∩ C 2,i | = i, repeat the reasoning from this section, and obtain the thesis of Theorem 2 for a committee-pairs scoring function d defined for such pairs (I 1 , I 2 ) that |I 1 ∩ I 2 | = i. Repeating this for each i allows us to derive the full-fledged function d for pairs (I 1 , I 2 ) of arbitrary size of intersection, and consequently, to prove Theorem 2 for f k .
Young-Style Characterization of Committee-Pairs Scoring Rules
This way we have proven an analogous result to our main Theorem 1 for decision rules.
Corollary 1. A decision rule is symmetric, committee-neutral, consistent, and continuous if and only if it is a committee-pair scoring rule.
As in interlude, we argue that this corollary is likely to be far more important than simply being a by product on our way to characterizing committee scoring rules. Indeed, we believe that there are natural committee-pairs scoring rules that are not committee scoring rules, and that still are very useful. For example, let us consider a committee pairs scoring rule (for committee size k) defined through the following committee pairs scoring function d: If we take committee size to be k = 1, then given a preference profile P, the committee-pairs scoring rule defined by d simply returns a weighted equivalent of P's majority graph. A majority graph for a preference profile is a directed graph where each candidate is a vertex, and for each two candidates c and d there is a directed edge from c to d exactly if more voters prefer c to d.
For committee sizes k > 1, our committee-pairs scoring rule would give us some generalization of the majority graph for committees. Indeed, in some sense, every committee-pairs scoring rule can be seen as providing some sort of generalization of the majority graph. Naturally, given a majority graph (or some its generalization provided by a committee-pairs scoring rule), it is not at all obvious which candidate (or which committee) should be a winner. However, there is a whole theory of tournament solution concepts that one can employ to figure this out (we point the reader to Laslier's textbook for an overview [33] ). While deeper study of committee-pairs scoring rules and decision rules is not in the scope of this paper, we believe it is a very interesting direction for future research.
Getting Ready for the Second Domain Change
We have almost completed the first part of the proof. However, we still need to derive one more technical tool (Lemma 4 below). However, to achieve this goal, we need to change our domain from N m! to Q m! , and before we make this change, we need to introduce several new notions. (While the correctness of our first domain relied on the decision rule being symmetric, this second domain change, as noted by Young [51] , uses our further axioms.)
We distinguish one specific voting situation, e = 1, 1, . . . , 1 , called the null profile, describing the setting where each possible vote is cast exactly once. It immediately follows that under each symmetric k-decision rule f k , each two committees are ranked equally in e, i.e., for each two committees C ′ 1 , C ′ 2 we have C ′ 1 = e C ′ 2 . Definition 8 (Independence of Symmetric Profiles). A symmetric k-decision rule f k is independent of symmetric profiles if for every voting situation P ∈ N m! and for every ℓ ∈ N, we have that f k (P + ℓe) = f k (P).
Definition 9 (Homogeneity). A symmetric k-decision rule f k is homogeneous if for every voting situation P ∈ N m! and for every
Intuitively, independence of symmetric profiles says that if we add one copy of each possible vote then they will all cancel each other out. Homogeneity says that the result of an election depends only on the proportions of votes with particular preference voters and not on their exact numbers. One can verify that each symmetric and consistent k-decision rule satisfies both independence of symmetric profiles and homogeneity (indeed, the requirement in the definition of homogeneity is a special case of the requirement from the definition of consistency). 7
Second Domain Change Now we are ready to perform our second domain change, to extend our domain from N m! to Q m! . To this end, we use the following result, originally stated for single-winner rules but it can be adapted to the multiwinner setting in a straightforward way.
Theorem 3 (Young [51] , Merlin [37] ). Let f k be k-decision rule, f k : N m! → S k (A) × S k (A) → {−1, 0, 1} that is symmetric, independent of symmetric profiles and homogeneous. There exists a unique extension of f k to the domain Q m! (which we also denote by f k ), satisfying for each ℓ ∈ N, and P ∈ N m! the following two conditions:
From now on, when we speak of voting situations, we mean voting situations from our new domain, Q m! . We note that within our new domain, the score of a pair (C 1 , C 2 ) of committees within voting situations P under committee-pairs scoring function d can still be expressed as:
P(π) · d(pos π (C 1 ), pos π (C 2 )).
Indeed, for committee-pairs scoring rules, this definition gives the unique extension that Theorem 3 speaks of.
Completing the First Part of the Proof Throughout most of the discussion so far, C 1 and C 2 were two fixed committees. However, since their choice was arbitrary, all the results we have established so far hold for all pairs of committees. From now on we no longer assume C 1 and C 2 to be these two fixed committees.
Since Q m! is a linear space over the field of rational numbers, from Theorem 2 we infer that for each two committees C 1 and C 2 , the space of voting situations P such that C 1 = P C 2 is a hyperplane in the m!-dimensional vector space of all voting situations. This is so, because if we treat a voting situation P as a vector of m! variables, then condition score d (C 1 , C 2 , P) = 0 turns out to simply be a single linear equation. Hence, the space of voting situations P such that C 1 = P C 2 is a hyperplane and has dimension m! − 1.
hyperplane in the vector space of all voting situations.
From now on, we assume that our k-decision rule f k is transitive, that is, we require that for each voting situation P and each three committees C ′ 1 , C ′ 2 , and C ′ 3 it holds that:
In other words, from now on we require f k to be a k-winner election rule.
require from them already follows from consistency. The reason is that, we believe, these two properties better explainon the intuitive level-why the second domain change is correct.
Lemma 4. Let f k be a symmetric, consistent, committee-neutral, committee-dominant, continuous k-winner election rule, and let λ :
[m] k → R be a committee scoring function. If it holds that for each two committees C 1 and C 2 and each voting situation P it holds that the committee scores of C 1 and C 2 are equal (according to λ) if and only C 1 and C 2 are equivalent according to f k , then it holds that: For each two committees C 1 and C 2 and each voting situation P, if the committee score of C 1 is greater than that of C 2 (according to λ) then C 1 is preferred over C 2 according to f k (i.e., C 1 ≻ P C 2 ).
Proof. Based on λ, we build a committee-pairs scoring function g as follows. For each two committee positions I 1 and I 2 , we have g(I 1 , I 2 ) = λ(I 1 ) − λ(I 2 ). The score of a committee pair (C 1 , C 2 ) in voting situation P under committee-pairs score function g is given by:
P(π) · g(pos π (C 1 ), pos π (C 2 )).
Let us fix x ∈ [k − 1] and two arbitrary committees C * 1 and C * 2 such that |C * 1 ∩ C * 2 | = x. We note that, by the assumptions of the theorem, if it holds that:
then, by Corollary 3, H = {P ∈ Q m! : C * 1 = P C * 2 )} is an (m! − 1)-dimensional hyperplane. More so, this is the same hyperplane as the following two (where d is the committee-pairs scoring function from the thesis of Theorem 2, built for f k ):
{P ∈ Q m! : score g (C * 1 , C * 2 , P) = 0} and {P ∈ Q m! : score d (C * 1 , C * 2 , P) = 0},
We claim that for C * 1 and C * 2 one of the following conditions must hold: 1. For each voting situation P, if score g (C * 1 , C * 2 , P) > 0 then C * 1 ≻ P C * 2 .
2. For each voting situation P, if score g (C * 1 , C * 2 , P) > 0 then C * 2 ≻ P C * 1 . Why is this so? For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that there exist two voting situations, P and Q, such that score g (C * 1 , C * 2 , P) > 0 and score g (C * 1 , C * 2 , Q) > 0, but C * 1 P C * 2 and C * 2 Q C * 1 . From the fact that score g (C * 1 , C * 2 , P) > 0 and score g (C * 1 , C * 2 , Q) > 0, we see that the points P and Q lie on the same side of hyperplane H and neither of them lies on H. From C * 1 P C * 2 , C * 2 Q C * 1 , and from Theorem 2, we see that score d (C * 1 , C * 2 , P) ≥ 0 and score d (C * 1 , C * 2 , Q) ≤ 0. That is, at least one of the voting situations P and Q lies on the hyperplane, or they both lie on different sides of the hyperplane. This gives a contradiction and proves our claim. Now, using the committee dominance axiom, we exclude the second condition. For each i ∈ [m − k + 1] we set I i = {i, i + 1, . . . , i + k − 1}. Let I and J denote, respectively, the best possible and the worst possible position of a committee, i.e., I = I 1 and J = I m−k+1 . For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that there exists a profile P, where score g (C * 1 , C * 2 , P) > 0 and C * 2 ≻ P C * 1 . Since there exists a profile with score g (C * 1 , C * 2 , P) > 0, it must be the case that λ(I) > λ(J) (otherwise λ would be a constant function). Thus there must exist p such that λ(I p ) > λ(I p+k−x ). Let us consider a voting situation S consisting of a single vote where C * 1 stands on position I p and C * 2 stands on position I p+k−x . Since λ(I p ) > λ(I p+k−x ), we have that score g (C * 1 , C * 2 , S ) > 0. By committee-dominance of f k , it follows that C * 1 P C * 2 . However, from the reasoning in the preceding paragraph (applied to profile P), we know that either C * 1 ≻ P C * 2 or C * 2 ≻ P C * 1 . Putting these two facts together, we conclude that C * 1 ≻ P C * 2 . Since we have shown a single profile P such that score g (C * 1 , C * 2 , P) > 0 and C * 1 ≻ P C * 2 , by the argument from the previous paragraph, we know that for every profile P it holds that:
Our choice of committees C * 1 and C * 2 was arbitrary and, thus, the above implication holds for all pairs of committees. This completes the proof.
Given Lemma 4, in our following discussion we can focus our attention on the space {P : C 1 = P C 2 }. If we show that committees C 1 and C 2 are equivalent, according to some given k-winner election rule, if and only if the score of C 1 is equal to the score of C 2 , according to some committee scoring function λ, then we can conclude that f k is a committee scoring rule defined by committee scoring function λ. This observation concludes the first part of the proof.
Second Part of the Proof: Committees with All but One Candidate in Common
We now start the second part of the proof. The current section is independent from the results of the previous one, but we do use all the notation that was introduced and, in particular, we consider voting situations over Q m! . We will use results from Section 4.1 in the next section, where we conclude the whole proof.
The Setting and Our Goal Throughout this section, we assume f k to be a k-winner election rule that is symmetric, consistent, committee-neutral, committee-dominant, and continuous. As before, the committee size is k. Our goal is to show that as long as we consider committees that contain some k − 1 fixed members and can differ only in the final one, f k can be seen as a committee scoring rule. The discussion in this section is inspired by that of Young [51] and Merlin [37] , but the main part of our analysis is new (in particular Lemma 8).
Position-Difference Function
Let P be a voting situation in Q m! , C be some size-k committee, and I be a committee position. We define the weight of position I with respect to C within P as:
That is pos-weight I (C, P) is the (rational) number of votes in which committee C is ranked on position I.
For each two committees C 1 , C 2 such that |C 1 ∩ C 2 | = k − 1, we define a committee positiondifference function α Naturally, α C 1 ,C 2 (P) is a linear function of P. We also note that for each voting situation P, we have:
To see why this is the case, we note that I∈[m] k pos-weight I (C 1 , P) = π∈Π > (A) P(π) because every vote is accounted exactly once. Thus, we have that:
Position-difference functions will be important technical tools that we will soon use in the proof (in particular, in Lemma 8 we will show that if α C 1 ,C 2 (P) = 0, . . . , 0 then C 1 = P C 2 ). However, we need to provide some more tools first.
Johnson Graphs and Hamiltonian Paths
We will need the following graph-theoretic results to build certain votes and preference profiles in our following analysis. We mention that the graphs that Lemmas 5 and 6 speak of are called Johnson graphs. Lemma 5 has been shown before (we found the result in the work of Asplach [2] and could not trace an earlier reference 8 ), and we provide the proof for the sake of completeness. Lemma 5. Let p and j be integers such that 1 ≤ j ≤ p. Let G( j, p) be a graph constructed in the following way. We associate j-element subsets of {1, . . . p} with vertices and we say that two vertices are connected if the corresponding subsets differ by exactly one element (they have j − 1 elements in common). Such a graph contains a Hamiltonian path, i.e., a path that visits each vertex exactly once, that starts from the set {1, . . . , j} and ends in the set {p − j + 1, . . . , p}.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction over j and p. For j = 1 and for each p ≥ 1, it is easy to see that the required path exists (in this case, the graph is simply a full clique). This provides the induction base. For the inductive step, we assume that there are two numbers, p ′ and j ′ , such that for each p and j ( j ≤ p) such that p < p ′ and j < j ′ it holds that graph G( j, p) contains a Hamiltonian path satisfying the constraints from the lemma. We will prove that such a path also exists for G( j ′ , p ′ ).
We partition the set of vertices of
consists of all sets of j elements (vertices of the graph) such that x is the lowest among them.
We build our Hamiltonian path for G( j ′ , p ′ ) as follows. We start with the vertex {1, . . . , j ′ }. By our inductive hypothesis, we know that there is a path that starts with {1, . . . , j ′ }, traverses all vertices in V( j ′ , p ′ , 1), and ends in {1, p ′ − j ′ + 2, . . . , p ′ }. From {1, p ′ − j ′ + 2, . . . , p ′ } we can go, over a single edge, to {2, p ′ − j ′ + 2, . . . , p ′ }. Starting with this vertex, by our inductive hypothesis, we can traverse all the vertices of V( j ′ , p ′ , 2). Then, over a single edge, we can move to some vertex from V( j ′ , p ′ , 3) , traverse all the vertices there, and so on. By repeating this procedure, we will eventually reach some vertex in the set V( j ′ , p ′ , p ′ − j ′ + 1). However, V( j ′ , p ′ , p ′ − j ′ + 1) contains exactly one vertex, {p ′ − j ′ + 1, . . . , p ′ }. This means that we have found the desired Hamiltonian path. Lemma 6. Let r, p and j be integers such that 1 ≤ r ≤ p and 1 ≤ j ≤ p − 1. LetG( j, p, r) be a graph constructed in the following way: (i) A j-element subset of {1, . . . , p} is a vertex ofG( j, p, r) exactly if it contains at least one element smaller than r. (ii) There is an edge between two vertices if they differ in exactly one element (i.e., if they have j − 1 elements in common). Such a graph contains a Hamiltonian path.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the previous one. We partition the set of vertices ofG( j, p, r) into r − 1 groups V( j, p, 1), . . . , V( j, p, r − 1), where for each x ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1}, group V( j, p, x) consists of all the sets (i.e., all the vertices) such that x is their smallest member.
We build our Hamiltonian path forG( j, p, r) as follows. We start with the vertex {1, . . . , j}. By Lemma 5, we can continue the path from {1, . . . , j}, traverse all vertices in V( j, p, 1), and end in {1, p − j + 2, . . . , p}. From {1, p − j + 2, . . . , p} we can go, over a single edge, to {2, p − j + 2, . . . , p}, and we can traverse all vertices in V( j, p, 2). Then we can go, over a single edge, to some vertex from V( j, p, 3), and we can continue in the same way as in the proof of Lemma 5.
The Codomain of α C 1 ,C 2 Let us consider two distinct committees C 1 and C 2 . Using Lemma 5, we establish the dimension of the codomain of function α C 1 ,C 2 . This result will be useful in the proof of Lemma 8.
Lemma 7.
Let C 1 and C 2 be two distinct committees. The codomain of the function α C 1 ,C 2 has dimension m k − 1.
Proof. From Equation (16), we get that the dimension of the codomain of function α C 1 ,C 2 is at most C 1 -C 2 -Symmetric Profiles The final tool that we need to provide before we prove Lemma 8 is the definition of C 1 -C 2 -symmetric profiles. Suppose σ is a permutation of A. Then we can extend its action to linear orders and voting situations in the natural way. Definition 10. Let C 1 and C 2 be two size-k committees. We say that a voting situation P is C 1 -C 2symmetric if there exists a permutation of the set of candidates σ and a sequence of committees F 1 , F 2 , . . . , F x such that:
If a voting situation P is C 1 -C 2 -symmetric then we know that C 1 = P C 2 . Why is this the case? For the sake of contradiction let us assume that C 1 P C 2 , and, without loss of generality, that C 1 ≻ P C 2 . From C 1 ≻ P C 2 (which translates to F 1 ≻ P F 2 ) by symmetry of f k we infer that F 2 ≻ σ(P) F 3 , thus that F 2 ≻ P F 3 . By the same arguments, we get that F 1 ≻ P F 2 ≻ P F 3 ≻ P . . . ≻ P F x . Thus, we get that C 1 ≻ P C 1 , a contradiction.
Further, we observe that for each C 1 -C 2 -symmetric voting situation P it holds that α C 1 ,C 2 (P) = 0, . . . , 0 . Indeed, using notation from Definition 10, we note that since σ(C 1 ) = C 2 and since σ(P) = P, for each (fractional) vote in P where committee C 1 stands on some position I we can uniquely assign a (fractional) vote in P where committee C 2 stands on the same position I. This shows that α C 1 ,C 2 (P) ≥ 0, . . . , 0 . By an analogous argument (using the fact that σ (−1) (C 2 ) = C 1 and σ (−1) (P) = P) we infer that α C 1 ,C 2 (P) ≤ 0, . . . , 0 and, so, we conclude that α C 1 ,C 2 (P) = 0, . . . , 0 .
Inferring Committee Equivalence Using α C 1 ,C 2 We are ready to present our main technical tool, Lemma 8. On the intuitive level, it says that information provided by the α C 1 ,C 2 function for a profile P is sufficient to distinguish whether C 1 is equivalent to C 2 with respect to P. Lemma 8. For each two committees C 1 , C 2 ∈ S k (A) such that |C 1 ∩ C 2 | = k − 1 and for each voting situation P ∈ Q m! , if α C 1 ,C 2 (P) = 0, . . . , 0 , then C 1 = P C 2 .
Proof. The kernel of a linear function is the space of all vectors for which this function returns the zero vector. In particular, the kernel of α C 1 ,C 2 , denoted ker(α C 1 ,C 2 ), is the space of all voting situations P such that α C 1 ,C 2 (P) = 0, . . . , 0 . Since the domain of function α C 1 ,C 2 has dimension m! and, by Lemma 7, its codomain has dimension m k − 1, the kernel of α C 1 ,C 2 has dimension m! − m k + 1. We will construct a base of this kernel that will consists of C 1 -C 2 -symmetric voting situations only. Since for each C 1 -C 2 -symmetric voting situation P it holds that C 1 = P C 2 and α C 1 ,C 2 (P) = 0, . . . , 0 , by consistency of f k and linearity of α C 1 ,C 2 we will get the thesis of the theorem.
We prove the statement by a two-dimensional induction on k (committee size) and m (size of the set of candidates). As a base for the induction we will show that the property holds for k = 1 and all values of m. For the inductive step we will show that from the fact that the property holds for committee size j − 1 and for p − 1 candidates it follows that the property also holds for committee size j and for p candidates. This will allow as to conclude that the property holds for all values of m and k with m ≥ k.
For k = 1 and for an arbitrary value of m, the problem collapses to the single-winner setting. It has been shown by Young [51] (and by Merlin [37] ) that for each two candidates c 1 and c ′ 1 , there exists a base of ker(α {c 1 },{c ′ 1 } ) that consists of m! − (m − 1) voting situations which are {c 1 }-{c ′ 1 }symmetric. This gives us the base for the induction.
Let us now prove the inductive step. We want to show that the statement is satisfied for A p = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . a p }, C 1, j = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a j } and C 2, j = {a ′ 1 , a 2 , . . . , a j }, where we set a ′ 1 = a j+1 . (We note that since f k is symmetric, the exact names of the candidates we use here are irrelevant, and we picked these for notational convenience.) From the sets A p , C 1, j and C 2, j we take out element a j and get A p −1 = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a j−1 , a j+1 , . . . a p }, C 1,( j−1) = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a j−1 } and C 2,( j−1) = {a ′ 1 , a 2 , . . . , a j−1 }. Let V j−1 be a base of ker(α C 1,( j−1) ,C 2,( j−1) ) that consists of C 1,( j−1) -C 2,( j−1)symmetric voting situations. We know that it exists from the induction hypothesis. We also know that it consists of (p−1)!− p−1 j−1 +1 voting situations. We now build the desired base for ker(α C 1, j ,C 2, j ) using V j−1 as the starting point. Our base has to consist of p! − p j + 1 linearly independent, C 1, j -C 2, j -symmetric voting situations.
First, for each voting situation P ∈ V j−1 and for each r ∈ {1, . . . p} we create a voting situation P r as follows. We take each vote v in P and we put a j in the r-th position of v, pushing the candidates on positions r, r + 1, r + 2, . . . back by one position, but keeping their relative order unchanged. There are p! − p p−1 j−1 + p such vectors and it is easy to see that they are linearly independent. Let us refer to the set of these vectors as B 1 . Naturally, the vectors from B 1 do not span the whole space ker(α {a 1 ,...,a j },{a ′ 1 ,...,a j } ); there is simply to few of them. However, there is also a certain structural reason for this and understanding this reason will help us further in the proof. Let lin(B 1 ) denote the set of linear combinations of voting situations from B 1 . For each r ∈ {1, . . . p} and each T ∈ lin(B 1 ), let T (a j → r) denote the voting situation that consists of all votes from T which have a j on the r-th position. We can see that for each r ∈ {1, . . . p} and each T ∈ lin(B 1 ), it holds that α C 1, j ,C 2, j (T (a j → r)) = 0, . . . , 0 (the reason for this is that T (a j → r) is, in essence, a linear combination of voting situations from V j−1 , with a j inserted at position r) . This property certainly does not hold for all the voting situations in ker(α {a 1 ,...,a j },{a ′ 1 ,...,a j } ). We now form the second part of our base, denoted B 2 and consisting of p p−1 j−1 · j−1 j − (p − 1) voting situations (C 1, j -C 2, j -symmetric and linearly independent from each other and all the voting situations in B 1 ). We start constructing each voting situation in B 2 by constructing its distinctive vote. To construct a distinctive vote, we first select the position for candidate a j ; we consider each position from {1, . . . p}. Let us fix r ∈ {1, . . . p} as the position that we picked. Next, we select a set of j positions for the candidates from {a 1 , . . . , a j−1 , a ′ 1 }. To do that, we first construct the following graph. We associate all sets of j − 1 positions such that r is greater 9 than at least one of them with vertices (for a fixed r there are p−1 j−1 − p−r j−1 such vertices; we choose j − 1 positions out of p − 1 still available, but we omit the situations where all these j − 1 positions are greater than r). We say that two vertices are connected if the corresponding sets differ by exactly one element. From Lemma 6 it follows that such a graph contains a Hamiltonian path. Now, for each edge (X, X ′ ) on the considered Hamiltonian path we do the following. Let B = X ∩ X ′ , and let b and b ′ be the two elements such that b < b ′ and {b, b ′ } = (X \ B) ∪ (X ′ \ B). (In other words, b and b ′ are the two elements on which X and X ′ differ.) Note that |B| = j − 2. We form a distinctive vote by putting candidate a j on position r, candidates a 2 , . . . , a j−1 on the positions from B (in some arbitrary order), a 1 on position b, a ′ 1 on position b ′ , and all the other candidates on the remaining positions (in some arbitrary order).
How many distinctive votes have we constructed? There are p possible values for the position of a j , and for each such position we consider a graph. If the position of a j is r, then the graph has p−1 j−1 − p−r j−1 vertices. Thus, altogether, there number of vertices is: 10
(An intuitive way to obtain the same result is as follows. Let us fix the value r uniformly at random. The vertices for the graph for this value of r are size-( j − 1) subsets of p − 1 positions, except those subsets that contain only elements greater than r. By symmetry, on the average the number of subsets that we omit is a 1 j fraction of all the subsets. Since we have all the graphs for all values of r, altogether we have p p−1 j−1 j−1 j vertices.) One of the graphs is empty (it is the one that is constructed for r = 1, because there is no element in {1, . . . , p} lower than r = 1). Thus we have p − 1 non-empty graphs. As a result, the total number of edges in the considered Hamiltonian paths is p p−1 j−1 j−1 j − (p − 1). Every edge corresponds to a distinctive vote, so this is also the number of distinctive votes constructed.
For each distinctive vote v constructed, we build a voting situation as follows:
If a 1 and a ′ 1 are both ranked ahead of a j , then we let τ be permutation τ := (a 1 , a j , a ′ 1 ) (i.e., we let τ be the identity permutation except that τ(a 1 ) = a j , τ(a j ) = a ′ 1 , τ(a ′ 1 ) = a 1 ) and we let the voting situation consist of three votes, v, τ(v), and τ (2) (v):
v : · · · ≻ a 1 ≻ · · · ≻ a ′ 1 ≻ · · · ≻ a j ≻ · · · τ(v) : · · · ≻ a j ≻ · · · ≻ a 1 ≻ · · · ≻ a ′ 1 ≻ · · · τ (2) (v) : · · · ≻ a ′ 1 ≻ · · · ≻ a j ≻ · · · ≻ a 1 ≻ · · · Note that permutation τ and the sequence F 1 = {a 1 , . . . , a j },
. . , a j } witness that this voting situation is C 1, j -C 2, j -symmetric. Case 2. If it is not the case that a 1 and a ′ 1 are both ranked ahead of a j in the distinctive vote v, then we know that there is some other candidate a ∈ {a 2 , . . . , a j−1 } ranked ahead of a j . This is due to our construction of distinctive votes-we always put a j on position r and make sure that there is some candidate ranked on a position ahead of r. If all the candidates a 2 , . . . , a j−1 were ranked behind a j , then it would have to be the case that both a 1 and a ′ 1 are ranked ahead of a j . Since it is not the case that both a 1 and a ′ 1 are ranked ahead of a j , there must be some other candidate from {a 2 , . . . , a j−1 } that is. We call this candidate a. We let ρ be permutation 10 The second equality follows from a standard property of binomial coefficients: for m, n ∈ N we have n k=0 k m = n+1 m+1 . ρ := (a 1 , a ′ 1 )(a, a j ) (i.e., we let ρ be the identity permutation, except that it swaps a 1 with a ′ 1 and a with a j ). We form a voting situation that consists of v and ρ(v):
v : · · · ≻ a ≻ · · · ≻ a j ≻ · · · ≻ a 1 ≻ · · · ≻ a ′ 1 ≻ · · · ρ(v) : · · · ≻ a j ≻ · · · ≻ a ≻ · · · ≻ a ′ 1 ≻ · · · ≻ a 1 ≻ · · · Permutation ρ and the sequence F 1 = {a 1 , . . . , a j }, F 2 = {a 2 , . . . , a j , a ′ 1 }, F 3 = {a 1 , . . . , a j } witness that this is a C 1, j -C 2, j -symmetric voting situation.
Set B 2 consists of all the voting situations constructed from the distinctive votes.
For each r ∈ {1, . . . , p}, each set of j−1 positions R from {1, . . . , p}\{r}, and each voting situation P, we define γ r,R (P) to be the total (possibly fractional) number of votes from P that have a j on the r-th position and that have candidates from {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a j−1 } on positions from R. We define γ ′ r,R (P) analogously, for the votes where a j is on position r and candidates a ′ 1 , a 2 , . . . , a j−1 take positions from R. We define α r,R (P) to be γ r,R (P) − γ ′ r,R (P). For example, for each P ∈ B 1 we have α r,R (P) = 0. Let us consider voting situations from B 2 which were created from a single Hamiltonian path in one of the graphs. The distinctive votes for all these voting situations have a j on the same position; we denote this position by r. For each such voting situation P, each non-distinctive vote belonging to P has a j on a position ahead of position r. Further, we see that there exist exactly two sets R 1 and R 2 such that α r,R 1 (P) 0 and α r,R 2 (P) 0. These are the sets that correspond to the vertices connected by the edge from which the distinctive vote for P was created (for one of them, let us say R 1 , we have α r,R 1 (P) = 1, and for the other we have α r,R 2 (P) = −1; to see that this holds, recall that a j is ranked on positions ahead of r in non-distinctive votes and, thus, it suffices to consider the distinctive vote only). Now we are ready to explain why the vectors from B 1 ∪ B 2 are linearly independent. For each nontrivial linear combination L of the vectors from B 1 ∪ B 2 we will show that L cannot be equal to the zero vector. For the sake of contradiction let us assume that L = 0, . . . , 0 . We start with showing that all coefficients of vectors from B 2 in L are equal to zero. Again, for the sake of contradiction let us assume that this is not the case. Let B ′ 2 consist of those vectors from B 2 that appear in L with a non-zero coefficient. Let r be the largest position of a j in some vote in B ′ 2 (by "largest position" we mean largest numerically, i.e., for each vote v that occurs in some voting situation from B ′ 2 it holds that pos v (a j ) ≤ r). Let B ′ 2,r be the set of all voting situations from B ′ 2 that have some votes which have a j on position r. Each voting situation in B ′ 2,r consists of either two or three votes. However, the votes belonging to those voting situations which have a j on position r must be distinctive votes (all non-distinctive votes for voting situations in B 2 have a j on positions ahead of r). Each such distinctive vote is built from an edge of a single Hamiltonian path (they come from the same Hamiltonian path because otherwise they would not have a j on the same position). Let S be a voting situation in B ′ 2,r that has a distinctive vote built from the latest edge on the path, among the edges that contributed voting situations to B ′ 2,r (to make this notion meaningful, we orient the path in one of the two possible ways). Let R 1 and R 2 be the sets of j − 1 positions that form this edge. By the reasoning from the previous paragraph we have that α r,R 1 (S ) 0, α r,R 2 (S ) 0, and one of the following two conditions must hold (depending on the orientation of the Hamiltonian path that we chose):
1. For each voting situation Q ′ in B ′ 2 other than S we have α r,R 1 (Q ′ ) = 0. 2. For each voting situation Q ′ in B ′ 2 other than S we have α r,R 2 (Q ′ ) = 0. Further, for each Q ∈ B 1 we have α r,R 1 (Q) = α r,R 2 (Q) = 0. Thus, since α r,R 1 and α r,R 2 are linear functions, we have that either α r,R 1 (L) 0 or α r,R 2 (L) 0. Thus, L cannot be a zero-vector, which gives a contradiction.
We have shown that all coefficients of vectors from B 2 used to form L are equal to zero. Thus L must be a linear combination of vectors from B 1 . However, the vectors from B 1 are linearly independent, which means that if L is 0, . . . , 0 , then the coefficients of all the vectors from B 1 are zeros. Thus we conclude that the vectors from B 1 ∪ B 2 are linearly independent.
It remains to show that B 1 ∪ B 2 indeed forms a base of the kernel of α C 1, j ,C 2, j . Since vectors in B 1 and B 2 are linearly independent, it suffices to check that the cardinality of B 1 ∪ B 2 is equal to the dimension of ker(α C 1, j ,C 2, j ). The number of vectors in B 1 ∪ B 2 is equal to:
This completes our induction. The proof works for arbitrary committees C 1 and C 2 due to symmetry of f k .
We are almost ready to show that for committees that differ by one candidate only, f k is a committee scoring rule, and to derive its committee scoring function. However, before we do that we need to change the domain once again. We will also need some notions from topology.
Topological Definitions
For every set S in some Euclidean space R n , by int(S ) we mean the interior of S , i.e., the largest (in terms of inclusion) open set contained in S . By conv(S ) we mean the convex hull of S , i.e., the smallest (in terms of inclusion) convex set that contains S . Finally, by S we define the closure of S , i.e., the smallest (in terms of inclusion) closed set that contains S . We use the concept of Q-convex sets of Young [51] and we recall his two observations. Definition 11 (Q-convex sets). A set S ∈ R n is Q-convex if S ∈ Q n and for each s 1 , s 2 ∈ S and each x ∈ Q, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, it holds that x · s 1 + (1 − x) · s 2 ∈ S . Lemma 9 (Young [51] ). Set S ∈ R n is Q-convex if and only if S = Q n ∩ conv(S ).
Lemma 10 (Young [51] ). If a set S is Q-convex, then S = conv(S ); moreover, S is convex.
Third Domain Change In the following arguments, we fix two arbitrary committees C 1 and C 2 such that |C 1 ∩ C 2 | = k − 1 and focus on them. (In other words, we consider function f C 1 ,C 2 instead of f k .) In this case, Lemma 8 allows us to change the domain of the function.
Let us consider two voting situations P and Q such that α C 1 ,C 2 (P) = α C 1 ,C 2 (Q). Since α C 1 ,C 2 is a linear function, we have α C 1 ,C 2 (P − Q) = 0, . . . , 0 . Thus, by Lemma 8, we know that C 1 = P−Q C 2 . We can express Q as Q = P + (Q − P) and thus, by consistency of f C 1 ,C 2 , we have that:
Consequently, to answer the question "what is the relation between committee C 1 and C 2 according to f C 1 ,C 2 in voting situation P?" it suffices to know the value α C 1 ,C 2 (P). In effect, we can restrict the domain of f C 1 ,C 2 to an m k − 1 -dimensional space D:
We interpret elements of D as the values of the committee position-difference function, α C 1 ,C 2 and, so, the condition I∈[m] k P[I] = 0 corresponds to the property of committee position-difference functions given in Equality 16. By the argument given above the definition of D, we know that from the point of view of comparing committees C 1 and C 2 using function f C 1 ,C 2 , the vector of values α C 1 ,C 2 provides the same information as a voting situation from which it is obtained. Thus, we can think of elements of D as corresponding to voting situations.
Separating Two Committees
We proceed by defining two sets, D 1 , D 2 ⊆ D, such that:
That is, D 1 corresponds to situations where, according to f C 1 ,C 2 , committee C 1 is preferred over C 2 , and D 2 corresponds to the situations where it is the other way round. From consistency of f C 1 ,C 2 , it follows that D 1 and D 2 are Q-convex.
We note that if f C 1 ,C 2 is trivial, i.e., if it ranks all committees as equal, then it can be expressed as a trivial committee scoring function. Assume that f C 1 ,C 2 is nontrivial. In this case one of the sets D 1 and D 2 is nonempty. From neutrality it follows that so is the other one. Now, we move our analysis from Q ( m k ) to R ( m k ) , by analyzing the closures of the sets D 1 and D 2 .
Lemma 11. The sets int(D 1 ) and D 2 are disjoint, convex, and nonempty relative to D (i.e., int(D 1 )∩ D ∅ and D 2 ∩ D ∅).
Proof. This lemma follows from the results given by Young [51] and Merlin [37] . However, in their cases the proofs are hidden in the text. We include an explicit proof for the sake of completeness. From Lemma 10, it follows that the sets D 1 and D 2 are convex and, thus, the interior int(D 1 ) is also convex. Now, we prove that D 1 ∪ D 2 = D, a fact that will be useful in our further analysis. If this is not the case, then D − (D 1 ∪ D 2 ) is open in D. Thus, there exists a point P and an m k − 1dimensional ball B such that P ∈ B ⊆ D − (D 1 ∪ D 2 ). Naturally, C 1 = P C 2 . Thus, for some S ∈ D 1 , there exists a (small) x ∈ Q, such that Q = x · S + (1 − x) · P belongs to the ball B. Since Q belongs to B, it must be the case that C 1 = Q C 2 . However, by consistency of f C 1 ,C 2 , we have that C 1 ≻ Q C 2 and, so, we have Q ∈ D 1 . This is a contradiction.
Next, we show that the set int(D 1 ) is nonempty, relatively to D. For the sake of contradiction, assume that int(D 1 ) ∩ D = ∅. Then, from neutrality, it follows that also int(D 2 ) ∩ D = ∅. Thus, D 1 and D 2 are nowhere dense in D, 11 and so are D 1 , D 2 , and D 1 ∪ D 2 = D. Consequently, we get that D is nowhere dense in D, a contradiction with the density of D in D 12 (density of D follows immediately from its definition). Now we show that int(D 1 ) and D 2 are disjoint. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that there exists P ∈ D, such that P ∈ int(D 1 ) and P ∈ D 2 . From Lemma 10, we get that int(D 1 ) = int(conv(D 1 )) = int(conv(D 1 )). This means that P ∈ int(conv(D 1 )) ∩ D 2 and, so, P ∈ conv(D 1 ) ∩ D 2 . Since P ∈ D 2 , we know that P ∈ Q ( m k ) . By Lemma 9 we know that D 1 = Q ( m k ) ∩conv(D 1 ). Thus, since P ∈ Q ( m k ) and P ∈ conv(D 1 ), we know that P ∈ D 1 . All in all, it must be the case that P ∈ D 1 ∩ D 2 , which is a contradiction because D 1 ∩ D 2 = ∅.
Finally, for the sake of contradiction, let us assume that there exists Q ∈ D, such that Q ∈ int(D 1 ) and Q ∈ D 2 . Since Q ∈ D 2 , this means that every open set containing Q must have nonempty intersection with D 2 . Consequently, int(D 1 ) has nonempty intersection with D 2 , which-by the previous paragraph-gives a contradiction. This completes the proof of the lemma.
Recovering the Scoring Function
We are finally ready to derive our committee scoring function. From the classic hyperplane separation theorem, it follows that there exists a vector η ∈ R ( m k ) such that (for P ∈ D, by η · P we mean the dot product of P and η, both treated as m k dimensional vectors):
1. For each voting situation P ∈ D 2 it holds that η · P ≤ 0 .
2. For each voting situation P ∈ int(D 1 ) it holds that η · P > 0.
We note that Lemma 11 allows us to directly apply the hyperplane separation theorem as the sets int(D 1 ) and D 2 are disjoint. This is different from Young's [51] and Merlin's [37] approach, who operate on sets with disjoint interiors, but which do not have to be disjoint on their own.
We now show that if P ∈ D and η · P > 0, then P ∈ D 1 . Since η · P > 0, P cannot belong to D 2 , but it might be the case that C 1 = P C 2 . For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that this is the case. We observe that there exists an m k − 1 -dimensional ball B in D with P ∈ B, such that for each S ∈ B we have C 1 S C 2 (this is because P does not belong to D 2 ). Let us now consider two cases. Case 1. If for each S ∈ B we have C 1 = S C 2 , then we proceed as follows. Let us take some Q such that C 1 ≻ Q C 2 . There must exist some (possibly very small) x such that S = x· Q + (1− x)· P ∈ B. However, from consistency we would get that C 1 ≻ S C 2 , a contradiction.
Case 2.
If there exists Q ∈ B such that C 1 ≻ Q C 2 , then we observe that there exists 0 < ǫ < 1 such that S = P−ǫQ 1−ǫ ∈ B. Since S ∈ B, we have that C 1 S C 2 . Further, we have that P = ǫQ + (1 − ǫ)S . By consistency of f C 1 ,C 2 we get that C 1 ≻ P C 2 . However, this is a contradiction.
Next, we show that if η · P < 0, then P ∈ D 2 . For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that there is P such that η · P < 0 but C 1 P C 2 . Then there exists such ǫ that if |Q − P| < ǫ then η · Q < 0 (and so Q int(D 1 )). Thus there exists a ball B in D with P ∈ B, such that B ∩ int(D 1 ) = ∅. Thus, B ∩ D 1 = ∅. We infer that some point S in B could be represented as a linear combination of P and some point from D 1 . From consistency we would get that C 1 ≻ S C 2 , a contradiction.
Remark 2.
We have shown that for each P ∈ D, (a) η · P > 0 implies that P ∈ D 1 (and, so, C 1 ≻ P C 2 ), and (b) η · P < 0 implies that P ∈ D 2 (and, so, C 2 ≻ P C 1 ). From symmetry, the same vector η works for each pair of committees C 1 and C 2 such that |C 1 ∩ C 2 | = k − 1. Now we will use continuity to prove that if η· P = 0 then C 1 = P C 2 . For the sake of contradiction let us assume that this is not the case, i.e., that there exists a voting situation P ∈ D such that η· P = 0 but C 1 P C 2 . Without loss of generality, let us assume that C 1 ≻ P C 2 . Let Q be a voting situation such that η · Q < 0 and so C 2 ≻ Q C 1 . For each x it holds that η · (xP + Q) < 0 and so C 2 ≻ xP+Q C 1 . However, this contradicts continuity of f k .
From the vector η, we retrieve a committee scoring function λ. For each committee position I ∈ [m k ] we set λ(I) = η[I]. Now, we can see that for each two committees C 1 , C 2 , and for each voting situation P ∈ Q m! it holds that (see the comment below for explanation what Q is):
where Q ∈ D is the representation of P in the space D. From the above inequality we see that score λ (C 1 , P) > score λ (C 2 , P) implies that C 1 ≻ P C 2 and that score λ (C 1 , P) = score λ (C 2 , P) implies that C 1 = P C 2 . From neutrality we get that the same committee scoring function λ works for every two committees, C ′ 1 and C ′ 2 , with |C ′ 1 ∩ C ′ 2 | = k − 1 There is one more issue we need to deal with. So far, we gave no argument as to why λ should satisfy the dominance property of committee scoring functions (i.e., that if I and J are two committee positions such that I dominates J, then λ(I) ≥ λ(J)). However, to get this property it suffices to assume the committee dominance axiom for f k .
Summarizing our discussion from this section, we get our main result, Theorem 1, for the committees C 1 and C 2 , with |C 1 ∩ C 2 | = k − 1. We will continue our analysis of the remaining cases in the subsequent sections.
Putting Everything Together: Comparing Arbitrary Committees
In the previous section we have shown that if a k-winner election rule f k is symmetric, committeeneutral, consistent, continuous, and has the committee dominance property then there exists a committee scoring function λ such that for each two committees C 1 and C 2 such that |C 1 ∩C 2 | = k−1 and each voting situation P ∈ Q m! it holds that score λ (C 1 , P) > score λ (C 2 , P) if and only if C 1 ≻ P C 2 , and score λ (C 1 , P) = score λ (C 2 , P) if and only if C 1 = P C 2 . In this section we complete our proof by showing that this holds (through the same function λ) for every two committees.
Setting Up the Proof Let f k be a k-winner election rule that is symmetric, committee-neutral, consistent, continuous, and has the committee dominance property. Let λ be the scoring function derived for this f k as described at the end of the previous section. We know that for each two committees C 1 and C 2 such that |C 1 ∩ C 2 | = k − 1 and each voting situation P ∈ Q m! it holds that score λ (C 1 , P) > score λ (C 2 , P) if and only if C 1 ≻ P C 2 , and score λ (C 1 , P) = score λ (C 2 , P) if and only if C 1 = P C 2 . We will show that the same holds for all committees C 1 and C 2 , irrespective of the size of their intersection. We will show this by induction over k − |C 1 ∩ C 2 |.
Let us fix some value k ′ < k − 1 and let us assume that λ can be used to distinguish whether some committee C 1 is preferred over some committee C 2 whenever |C 1 ∩ C 2 | > k ′ . We will show that the same λ can be used to distinguish whether a committee C 1 is preferred over a committee C 2 when |C 1 ∩ C 2 | = k ′ .
Let C 1 and C 2 be two arbitrary committees such that |C 1 ∩C 2 | = k ′ . Let us rename the candidates so that
The Case Where k − k ′ Is Even If k − k ′ is even, we consider the following two cases: Case 1: There exists a vector of 2k − k ′ positions p 1 , . . . , p 2k−k ′ such that:
Let us consider the committee
We consider the linear space of voting situations P ∈ Q m! such that C 1 = P C 3 and C 3 = P C 2 (the fact that this is a linear space follows from the inductive assumption; |C 1 ∩ C 3 | = |C 2 ∩ C 3 | > k ′ ). The conditions C 1 = P C 3 and C 3 = P C 2 are not contradictory (Consider the profile in which each vote is cast exactly once-in such profile all size-k committees are equivalent with respect to f k ). This space has dimension either m! − 2 or m! − 1. This is so, because each of the conditions C 1 = P C 3 and C 2 = P C 3 boils down to a single linear equation. If these equations are independent then the dimension is m! − 2. Otherwise, it is m! − 1. By transitivity of f k we get that in each voting situation P from this space it holds that C 1 = P C 2 and that the committee score of C 1 (according to λ) is equal to the committee score of C 2 . Let B be a base of this space. Further, let v be a vote where each candidate c i , i ∈ {1, . . . , 2k − k ′ }, stands on position p i (recall Equation (17) above), and let v ′ be an identical vote except that candidates from C 1 ∪ C 2 are listed in the reverse order (i.e., c 1 is on position p 2k−k ′ , c 2 is on position p 2k−k ′ −1 and so on). Let S b be a voting situation that consists of v and v ′ . The positions of C 1 and C 3 in v are:
The positions of C 1 and C 3 in v ′ are:
, . . . , p k−k ′ 2 +k } Consequently, according to (17) , in voting situation S b the committee score of C 1 is not equal to that of C 3 . By the inductive assumption, it must be the case that C 1 S b C 3 . This means that the voting situations in B ∪ {S b } are linearly independent.
We now show that C 1 = S b C 2 . Consider a permutation σ (over the candidate set) that swaps c 1 with c 2k−k ′ , c 2 with c 2k−k ′ −1 , and so on. We note that σ(C 1 ) = C 2 , σ(C 2 ) = C 1 , and S b = σ(S b ). Thus, by symmetry of f k , it must be the case that C 1 = S b C 2 . Further, the committee scores of C 1 and C 2 are equal in S b .
Altogether, the base B ∪ {S b } defines an (m! − 1)-dimensional space of voting situations P such that C 1 = P C 2 and the committee scores of C 1 and C 2 are equal. From Corollary 2 we know that the set of voting situations P such that C 1 = P C 2 forms a linear space of dimension m!−1. As a result, we get that for each voting situation P the condition C 1 = P C 2 is equivalent to the condition that C 1 has the same committee score as C 2 according to λ.
The fact that C 1 ≻ S C 2 whenever the committee score of C 1 is greater than of C 2 follows from Lemma 4.
Case 2:
For each vector of 2k − k ′ positions p 1 , . . . , p 2k−k ′ it holds that (note that the condition below is a negation of the condition from Case 1):
. . , p 2k−k ′ }). As before, let C 3 = {c k−k ′ 2 +1 , . . . , c k−k ′ 2 +k }. Since the above equality must hold for each vector of 2k −k ′ positions, we see that if the committee score of C 1 is equal to the committee score of C 3 , then the committee score of C 3 is equal to the committee score of C 2 . Consequently, by the inductive assumption, we get that C 1 = P C 3 implies that C 3 = P C 2 . Thus, by f k 's transitivity, we get that for each voting situation P, the condition C 1 = P C 3 implies that C 1 = P C 2 . As a consequence of this reasoning, there exists an (m! − 1)-dimensional space of voting situations P such that C 1 = P C 2 and such that C 1 has the same committee score as C 2 . Similarly as in Case 1, we conclude that for each voting situation P the condition C 1 = P C 2 is equivalent to the condition that C 1 has the same committee score as C 2 according to λ, and that it holds that C 1 ≻ P C 2 whenever the committee score of C 1 is greater than of C 2 (by Lemma 4).
The Case Where k − k ′ ≥ 3 and k − k ′ is Odd Similarly as before we consider two cases: In this case we can repeat the reasoning from Case 1 from the previous subsection (it suffices to take C 3 = {c x , . . . , c k+x−1 }). . . . , p k+⌈ k−k ′ 2 ⌉ }). Together, these two equalities give that:
. . . , p k+⌈ k−k ′ 2 ⌉ }). Since the above equality holds for each vector of 2k−k ′ positions, after renaming the positions, we get that for each set of k + 3 positions q 1 , . . . , q k+3 it holds that: λ({q 1 , . . . , q k }) + λ({q 4 , . . . , q k+3 }) = λ({q 2 , . . . , q k+1 }) + λ({q 3 , . . . , q k+2 }).
After reformulation we get: λ({q 1 , . . . , q k }) − λ({q 2 , . . . , q k+1 }) = λ({q 3 , . . . , q k+2 }) − λ({q 4 , . . . , q k+3 }).
If k is odd, we obtain the following series of equalities (the consecutive equalities, except for the last one, are consequences of applying Equality 18 to the cyclic shifts of the list q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q k+3 ; the last equality breaks the pattern and is a consequence of applying Equality 18 to the list q k+2 , q k+3 , q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q k−1 , q k+1 , q k ): λ({q 1 , . . . , q k }) − λ({q 2 , . . . , q k+1 }) = λ({q 3 , . . . , q k+2 }) − λ({q 4 , . . . , q k+3 }) = λ({q 5 , . . . , q k+3 , q 1 }) − λ({q 6 , . . . , q k+3 , q 1 , q 2 }) = λ({q 7 , . . . , q k+3 , q 1 , q 2 , q 3 }) − λ({q 8 , . . . , q k+3 , q 1 , q 2 , q 3 , q 4 })
. . .
= λ({q k+2 , q k+3 , q 1 , . . . , q k−2 }) − λ({q k+3 , . . . , q 1 , q k−1 }) = λ({q 1 , . . . , q k−1 , q k+1 }) − λ({q 2 , . . . , q k+1 }),
In consequence, it must be the case that λ({q 1 , . . . , q k }) = λ({q 1 , . . . , q k−1 , q k+1 }). Thus, by transitivity, we get that λ is a constant function (in essence, what we have shown is that we can replace positions in the set of k positions, one by one, without changing the value of the committee scoring function). Let C 3 = {c 2 , . . . , c k+1 }. Since λ is a constant function, then by the inductive assumption we have that for every voting situation P it holds that C 1 = P C 3 and C 3 = P C 2 . By transitivity we get that for each voting situation P it holds that C 1 = P C 2 . Thus our trivial scoring function works correctly on C 1 and C 2 .
Let us now assume that k is even. Now we obtain the following series of equalities (in this case all the consecutive equalities are consequences of applying Equality 18 to the cyclic shifts of the sequence q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q k+3 ): In consequence, it is the case that:
λ({q 1 , . . . , q k }) − λ({q 2 , . . . , q k+1 }) = λ({q 2 , . . . , q k+1 }) − λ({q 3 , . . . , q k+2 }), and this holds for every sequence q 1 , . . . , q k+2 of positions. Thus, we get that for each voting situation in which {c 1 , . . . , c k } is equivalent to {c 2 , . . . , c k+1 }, it also holds that {c 2 , . . . , c k+1 } is equivalent to {c 3 , . . . , c k+2 }, it also holds that {c 3 , . . . , c k+2 } is equivalent to {c 4 , . . . , c k+3 }, etc. Let C 3 = {c 2 , . . . , c k+1 }. From the preceding reasoning we have that for each voting situation P the fact that it holds that C 1 = P C 3 implies that C 1 = P C 2 . We conclude the proof in the same way as in the case of even k − k ′ (Case 2). Specifically, we conclude that there exists an (m! − 1)-dimensional space of voting situations P such that C 1 = P C 2 and such that C 1 has the same committee score as C 2 . This means that for each voting situation P the condition C 1 = P C 2 is equivalent to the condition that C 1 has the same committee score as C 2 according to λ, and that it holds that C 1 ≻ P C 2 whenever the committee score of C 1 is greater than of C 2 (by Lemma 4).
The End
We have shown that if a k-winner rule is symmetric, committee-neutral, consistent, continuous, and has the committee-dominance property, then it is a committee scoring rule. On the other hand, committee scoring rules satisfy all these conditions. This completes our proof of Theorem 1.
Related Work
Axiomatic characterizations of single-winner election rules have been studied actively for quite a long time. Indeed, the famous theorems of Arrow [1] and the related, and equally famous, results of Gibbard [26] and Satterthwaite [42] can be seen as axiomatic characterizations of the dictatorial rule 13 (however, typically these theorems are considered as impossibility results regarding design of 13 Under the dictatorial rule, the winner is the candidate most preferred by a certain fixed voter (the dictator).
majority graphs are often seen as inputs to election procedures (known as tournament solution concepts). For example, according to the Copeland method [13] the candidate with the greatest number of victories in pairwise comparisons with other candidates is a winner. The Smith set [48] is another example of such a rule: it returns the minimal (in terms of inclusion) subset of candidates, such that each member of the set is preferred by the majority of voters over each candidate outside the set. Fishburn [21] describes nine other solution concepts that explore the Condorcet principle for majority graphs. For an overview of tournament solution concepts we refer the reader to the book of Laslier [33] (and to the chapter of Brandt, Brill, and Harrenstein [9] for a more computational perspective). We believe that it would be a fascinating topic of research to explore the properties (computational or axiomatic) of the generalized tournaments generated by our decision rules.
Conclusions
We have provided an axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules, a new class of multiwinner voting rules recently introduced by Elkind et al. [15] . Committee scoring rules form a remarkably general class of multiwinner systems that consists of many nontrivial rules with a variety of applications. Thus, our characterization constitutes a fundamental framework for further axiomatic studies of this fascinating class and makes an important step towards their understanding. We mention that various properties of committee scoring rules, and the internal structure of the class, were already studied by Elkind et al. [15] and Faliszewski et al. [18, 17] . However, they mostly focused on specific rules and on subclasses of the whole class. Our main theorem required developing a set of useful tools and new concepts, such as decision rules. We believe that they are an interesting notion that deserves further study.
